Archives
POWERING THE HOUTHIS
CAR field investigators have documented more than 800 missile and UAV components recovered in maritime seizures in the Red Sea in 2024 and 2025. These provide critical insight into the composition and nature of advanced conventional weapon systems—like missiles and UAVs—in Houthi possession. This Frontline Perspective examines the missiles and UAVs available to the Houthis in Yemen, as identified through CAR’s analysis of documented components. It provides evidence of a continuing supply of Iranian-origin materiel to the Houthis in Yemen and explores the nature of the multipurpose components on which these missiles rely.
THE RISE OF THE G3 RIFLE ON THE ILLICIT MARKET IN SOMALIA
CAR data collectors have observed a significant increase in G3 7.62 × 51 mm rifles in Somalia’s illicit markets. This Frontline Perspective, drawing on a decade of data, shows that many of these powerful weapons were almost certainly modified by independent gunsmiths in Yemen before being trafficked to Somalia.
SALAFI JIHADISTS IN THE CENTRAL SAHEL – ISSUE 02
This Frontline Perspective focuses on weapons recovered between 2015 and 2023 from Salafi jihadist groups in the central Sahel. CAR’s investigations show that Salafi jihadist groups have no unique weapon supply sources and rely on local, predatory acquisition methods like other regional armed actors, while at least one-fifth of weapons seized in relation to Salafi jihadist activity were diverted from the state custody of eight North and West African countries.
LES SALAFISTES DJIHADISTES DANS LE SAHEL CENTRAL – NUMÉRO 02
Cette Perspective de la ligne de front se concentre sur les armes récupérées auprès des groupes salafistes djihadistes dans le Sahel central, et documentées par les enquêteurs de CAR entre 2015 et 2023. L’analyse de CAR montrent que ces groupes n’ont pas de sources d’approvisionnement en armes qui les distingueraient d’autres acteurs armés dans la région et qu’ils s’appuient sur des mécanismes d’acquisition surtout locales et prédatrices, avec au moins 20 pour cent des armes en lien avec l’activité des salafistes djihadistes détournées de la garde de huit États d’Afrique du Nord et de l’Ouest.
SALAFI JIHADISTS IN THE CENTRAL SAHEL – ISSUE 01
The central Sahel–encompassing Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, is enduring prolonged turmoil as Salafi jihadist groups expand through sustained attacks. This Frontline Perspective focuses on small-calibre ammunition recovered from Salafi jihadist groups in the central Sahel, and documented by CAR investigators between 2015–2023. CAR’s investigations show that a significant proportion of the ammunition was most likely to have been diverted from the custody of certain central Sahelian states, while a growing proportion was manufactured within ten years of its diversion.
LES SALAFISTES DJIHADISTES DANS LE SAHEL CENTRAL – NUMÉRO 001
Le Sahel central, englobant le Burkina Faso, le Mali et le Niger, traverse une période prolongée de troubles marquée par l’expansion continue de l’influence de groupes salafistes djihadistes, lesquels renforcent leur emprise par des attaques répétées. Cette Perspective de la ligne de front est consacrée aux munitions de petit calibre saisies auprès de ces groupes et documentées par les enquêteurs de CAR dans le Sahel central entre 2015 et 2023. Les investigations menées par CAR révèlent qu’une proportion substantielle de ces munitions a très probablement été détournée des arsenaux d’États de la région, tandis qu’une part croissante d’entre elles a été détournée au cours des dix années suivant leur fabrication.
ILLICIT WEAPONS IN AFGHANISTAN – ISSUE 03
Night vision equipment includes a range of imaging systems enabling humans to see at night, including thermal imaging devices. The Taliban's ability to access and deploy night vision equipment was a significant factor in the years before the group's takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021.
This Frontline Perspective, the third in a series from CAR's field operations in Afghanistan between 2019 and 2021, reports on two commercial supply lines through which the Taliban sought to procure thermal imaging weapon sights. These sights, manufactured in the past five years, were commercially available in the United States and United Arab Emirates.
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مكونات الصواريخ المستخدمة في هجمات الطائرات بدون طيار في شمال و شرق سوريا
بين أيلول 2021 وحزيران 2022، وثّق المحققون الميدانيون لمركز أبحاث التسليح أثناء الصراعات بقايا قطع صواريخ من 17 هجوم بصواريخ جو-أرض بالتعاون مع قوات الأمن المحلية. هذه أنظمة صواريخ تم تصنيعها في تركيا ومن المحتمل أنها أطلقت من الطائرات بدون طيار (انظر قسم “توثيق الضربات الصاروخية في سوريا”) وأظهرت تحقيقات مركز أبحاث التسليح أثناء الصراعات أن بعض مكونات الصواريخ تم تصنيعها في الخارج واستيرادها للاستخدام في صناعات الدفاع التركية وتشمل هذه مكونات مهمة متاحة تجارياً والتي لا يبدو أنها مشمولة بضوابط التصدير الحالية.
MISSILE COMPONENTS USED IN DRONE ATTACKS IN NORTHEAST SYRIA
Between September 2021 and June 2022, CAR investigations have documented the physical remnants of 17 air-to-surface missile attacks in north-east Syria. The missile systems were manufactured in Türkiye and likely fired from uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). This Frontline Perspective provides a technical overview of the missiles themselves, including CAR’s identification process and the internal components identified within the system. It then focuses on how electromagnetic brakes, which are used in accurate steering in missile technology, were manufactured by a company based in the European Union (EU) and were subsequently diverted from their stated end use in medical vehicles.
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ILLICIT WEAPONS IN AFGHANISTAN – ISSUE 02
Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in mid-August 2021, concerns have grown over the changing terrorist landscape in the country and the threat posed by groups such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). This second Frontline Perspective focuses on weapons used in two high-profile attacks in Kabul: the May 2019 Taliban-claimed attack on Counterpart International, and the November 2020 ISKP-claimed attack on Kabul University. It helps shine a spotlight on tactics and weapon selection for such high-profile attacks, and highlights important similarities between the weapons used.
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