The findings of an 18-month investigation mapping the human and financial networks behind the global procurement of goods and technologies for Islamic State weapons production. Shows how Islamic State procurers concealed their efforts behind front companies, pseudonymous communications and proxy purchasers.
An analysis of: Conflict Armament Research’s trace response archive; the processes that underpin tracing; and tracing as a tool to combat diversion.
This report shows that external supply chains have provided components for the construction of IEDS to Bahraini militants. This materiel is identical to materiel captured from Houthi forces in Yemen and demonstrates Bahraini militants’ capability to manufacture explosives and IEDs domestically.
This second edition of CAR’s Diversion Digest analyses a sample of end-user documents in CAR’s archive that relate to actual deliveries of conventional weapons and ammunition. The analysis finds increased risk of illicit arms transfers due to “deeply inconsistent” export certification practices.
This technical report addresses the need for a supply chain security approach to detect and react to cases of diversion of conventional ammunition. Based on CAR’s field data, this report profiles how ammunition is commonly diverted, outlines the limitations in how international arms control instruments address this issue, and details the mutually reinforcing control measures that make up ‘ammunition supply chain security.’
The report provides an extensive overview of landmines and IEDs being employed by Houthi forces on the west coast of Yemen. CAR’s investigations reveal that a significant portion of landmines are improvised and produced, domestically, by Houthi forces.
This first edition of CAR’s Diversion Digest presents a statistical analysis of how weapons diversion occurs. It looks at more than a thousand cases where weapons and ammunition have been captured, lost, stolen or otherwise diverted to illicit actors, and considers how the international Arms Trade Treaty might address these main causes of diversion.
In 2017, Islamic State forces deployed four different models of improvised recoilless launcher well suited for urban warfare. This report studies the features and components of these sophisticated inventions.
CAR presents comparative findings on explosively formed projectiles (EFPs), camouflaged to resemble natural rocks, documented in Yemen and similar devices documented by field investigation teams elsewhere in the Middle East.
This report is the result of more than three years of field investigation into Islamic State supply chains. It presents an analysis of more than 40,000 items recovered from the group between 2014 and 2017. These items encompass weapons, ammunition, and the traceable components and chemical precursors used by the group to manufacture improvised explosive devices.