


DISPATCH FROM THE FIELD

# NEW SUDANESE WEAPONS IN BLUE NILE STATE

April 2017





Published online by Conflict Armament Research  
© Conflict Armament Research Ltd., London, 2017  
First published in April 2017

This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of Conflict Armament Research and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of Conflict Armament Research, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organisation. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the secretary, Conflict Armament Research ([admin@conflictarm.com](mailto:admin@conflictarm.com)).

Cover Image: Factory boxed Sudanese-manufactured 60 mm mortar rounds.

Inside image: Drawings on the wall of an abandoned school in Chali, Blue Nile State.

Design and layout by Julian Knott ([www.julianknott.com](http://www.julianknott.com))

Maps produced by Michael Hopfensperger

# CONTENTS

---

<b>BACKGROUND</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>KEY FINDINGS</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>1. IRANIAN ARMS SUPPLIES</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>2. NEW WEAPONS DEPLOYED IN THE 2016 FIGHTING SEASON</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>3. EFFORTS TO CONCEAL ORIGINS OF SAF WEAPONS</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>4. HEAVY LOGISTICS VEHICLES</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>ENDNOTES</b>	<b>24</b>

# BACKGROUND


This *Dispatch from the Field* provides preliminary findings on weapons captured by the Sudan People's Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N) from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in Blue Nile State, Sudan. The SPLA-N captured the equipment primarily during the 2016 fighting season, along with a smaller number of weapons in 2014. In February 2017, Conflict Armament Research (CAR) documented the materiel in Kurmuk County, Blue Nile State.

Documenting and profiling SAF weapons is important because Sudan's security forces are both recipients and proliferators of illicit military materiel. Since 2005, Sudan has deployed weapons into Darfur in violation of the United Nations (UN) arms embargo on the region.<sup>1</sup> Sudan has also

obtained military materiel, which originates in the European Union (EU), despite an EU embargo on the country. Investigations since 2015 by CAR and UN investigative panels provide evidence that Sudanese security agencies have also violated UN arms embargoes on Libya and Côte d'Ivoire, and have provided weapons and ammunition clandestinely to non-state armed groups in South Sudan.

Generating a baseline of Sudanese weapon holdings thus serves two purposes: first, it assists in the identification of Sudanese materiel proliferating in other parts of Africa; second, it provides a measure of the effectiveness of international restrictions on arms supplies to Sudan.

**Map 1**  
**The 'Two Areas' in the SPLA-N and SAF conflict**



## THE CONFLICT IN BLUE NILE

The current conflict in Blue Nile State is now entering its sixth year. Unresolved promises of autonomy following South Sudan's secession from Sudan triggered the SPLA-N's rebellion in September 2011. Sudan's resulting counter-insurgency has officially closed Blue Nile to external observers and to humanitarian aid, with the two warring parties continuing to disagree on the modalities of aid delivery via Khartoum. Some 172,000 Blue Nile inhabitants remain displaced in refugee camps and informal settlements in Ethiopia and South Sudan. Fighting tends to be most intense between November and May, when the dry season allows forces to move more easily. Throughout the year, however, SAF has conducted regular, high-altitude aerial bombardment of military forces and civilian populations.

Despite military and material pressures, the SPLA-N's hold on territory has changed little in the last five years. The conflict's geographical stasis, however, belies significant efforts by both sides to advance their front lines. Evidence presented in this Dispatch indicates that SAF resupplied its forces in Blue Nile substantially in early 2016, reinforcing military units with newly acquired armour and other weapon types which differ markedly from the older weapon types deployed in South Kordofan—the larger theatre of operations in SAF's conflict with the SPLA-N, which lies to the west of Blue Nile.<sup>2</sup> During the 2016 fighting season in Blue Nile, the SPLA-N captured substantial quantities of new ammunition, artillery (122 mm D-30 pattern howitzers and 122 mm BM-

21 'Grad' multiple-launch rocket systems), main battle tanks, and armoured personnel carriers.

In June 2016, the Sudanese government declared a four-month ceasefire in both Blue Nile and South Kordofan, which has broadly held. The Government of Sudan unilaterally extended the ceasefire in January 2017. Nonetheless, in the first week of January 2017, the SPLA-N reported militia attacks on its positions at Aroum and Gerdan, which are situated at the western and eastern wings of its northern front line. In the southern part of SPLA-N territory, attacks followed between 18 and 26 January 2017 along a critical road running between South Sudan's Maban county and the Sudanese town of Yabus—the largest town held by the SPLA-N in Blue Nile. This road provides traders, soldiers, and civilians with access to South Sudan's economy and is a primary route to southern refugee camps.

At a time when Sudan and South Sudan have publicly reiterated pledges to prevent non-state actors from operating in each other's territories, these attacks provide a reminder that wider hostilities between non-state proxy forces in Blue Nile State and South Sudan's neighbouring Eastern Nile State remain possible. Such hostilities already pit the SPLA-N, which is broadly aligned with South Sudan's national armed forces (although there is little evidence of material support), against Mabanese and SPLA-IO militia forces, hostile to the SPLA-N and historically resupplied by elements within Sudan's security forces.



# KEY FINDINGS

## TANKS AND ARTILLERY FROM IRAN

Iran has provided SAF with heavier weapon systems than previously documented, including 122 mm artillery. Iran has also refurbished some of Sudan's T-55 tanks via a commercial entity, which is currently under US and UN sanctions. CAR is currently working to determine the dates of weapon transfer in order to assess whether the exports constitute violations of the Sudan sanctions regimes or contravene the post-2007 UN embargo on Iranian arms exports.

## RE-SUPPLY WITH NEW WEAPON TYPES

SAF substantially resupplied its forces fighting in Blue Nile for the 2016 fighting season, not only with significant quantities of newly manufactured weaponry, but with some of its most recently acquired weapon types. Materiel captured from SAF forces includes 2015- and 2016-packed small arms ammunition and mortar rounds, and a previously unknown type of Chinese armoured fighting vehicle, manufactured in 2014.

## EFFORTS TO CONCEAL WEAPONS' ORIGINS

The Sudanese government has continued and extended its efforts to conceal the origin of weapons and ammunition it uses on the battlefield, possibly to conceal violations of end-user agreements with supplier governments. This includes fully repackaging 2014-manufactured Chinese 7.62 x 54R mm ammunition as '2015 production' Sudanese ammunition and 'sanitising' (removing markings from) newly acquired Chinese-made small arms.

## EU-ORIGIN EQUIPMENT

The majority of SAF heavy military trucks deployed to Blue Nile, and captured by the SPLA-N, are types that a European export company has exported to Sudan from 2010 to at least December 2014. Two of the six heavy vehicles documented by CAR still displayed shipping stickers and paperwork issued by this company. The exports were lawful at the time because the European country of export did not require export licences for these vehicles. It has since expanded export controls on such vehicles. The commercial supply routes used in these cases demonstrate how Sudanese military procurement consistently uses civilian front companies, and also highlights the evolving regulatory efforts of EU Member States in response to such procurement.



# 1. IRANIAN ARMS SUPPLIES

Iranian arms previously documented in SAF stocks have comprised small arms and light weapons and small-calibre ammunition for these weapons.<sup>3</sup> CAR's analysis of these weapons indicates that Iran manufactured the majority—where identifiable—prior to 2000.<sup>4</sup>

The SPLA-N's weapon captures during the 2016 fighting season, at Mufu and Aroum along the western portion of its front line, provide the first evidence of heavy weapon supplies from Iran to Sudan. The captures include an Iranian-manufactured D-30I 122 mm howitzer, which appears in comparatively new condition (Figures 1-4), and Soviet-origin T-55 tanks which Iran's *Sanam Industrial Group* (an affiliate of Iran's state-owned Aerospace Industries Group) apparently refurbished (Figures 5-8). In July 2006 and March

2007, respectively, the US Treasury and the UN Security Council placed *Sanam Industrial Group* under international sanctions for alleged procurement to supply Iran's ballistic missile programme.<sup>5</sup>

CAR is currently working to establish the dates of production/refurbishment and the delivery dates of each weapon system. Electric cables fixed to the D-30I howitzer indicate production during or since 2002, but do not provide a precise date of manufacture.<sup>6</sup> The production date is an important legal consideration because the UN Security Council has prohibited all weapon imports from Iran since March 2007.<sup>7</sup> Production or delivery after March 2007 would thus indicate a violation of the sanctions regime.

## Figures 1-4

**Iranian-manufactured D-30I 122 mm howitzer, production date undetermined. Captured from SAF in Mufu, April 2016. Documented by CAR in a SPLA-N military area, February 2017 (precise location withheld).**



**Figure 1**



Figure 2



Figure 3



**Figure 4**

**Figures 5-8**

T-55 tank with internal components relabelled 'I.R.I. Sanam.' Captured from SAF in Aroum, April 2016. Documented by CAR in a SPLA-N military area, 12 February 2017 (precise location withheld).



**Figure 5**



Figure 6



Figure 7



**Figure 8**



*GRAD Type 81 captured by the SPLA-N.*

## 2. NEW WEAPONS DEPLOYED IN THE 2016 FIGHTING SEASON

SAF forces attacking the western end of the SPLA-N front line in 2016 not only deployed large volumes of new weaponry, but new weapon types. The latter arguably comprise some of Sudan's most recent international acquisitions and help build a picture of the country's recent military procurement.

The new weapon types in Blue Nile contrast markedly with older weapons captured from SAF forces during 2016 in South Kordofan State, which is the SPLA-N's other theatre of operations. The resupply and deployment of new weapon systems suggests a concerted effort by SAF to erode territory held by the SPLA-N in Blue Nile. Notably, it also indicates the involvement of regular SAF

armour and artillery units, rather than the militia-led attacks which international observers have primarily reported to date.<sup>8</sup>

Weapons captured at Aroum and Mufu include large quantities of 2015-packaged Chinese small arms ammunition (see Section 3 below) and 2016-manufactured Sudanese 60 mm mortar rounds (Figures 9-12).

SPLA-N also captured a 2014-manufactured Chinese APC of a previously unknown type, which has never before been documented on the battlefield (Figures 13-15). Sudan may be the first export customer for this type of APC.<sup>9</sup>



**Figures 9-12:**

2016-manufactured 60 mm mortar ammunition (lot number 02-16) consistent with Sudanese production. Packed in a Sudanese crate with 2014-manufactured primer cartridges and Chinese (2011 manufacture) M-6 fuses. Captured in Aroum, April 2016. Documented by CAR in a SPLA-N military area, February 2017 (precise location withheld).

**Figure 9****Figure 10**



Figure 11



Figure 12

**Figures 13-15**

Chinese-made 6 x 6 armoured personnel carrier of previously unknown type, manufactured in 2014. Captured in Aroum, April 2016. Documented by CAR at an SPLA-N armoured unit position, February 2017 (precise location withheld).

**Figure 13****Figure 14**



Figure 15



# 3. EFFORTS TO CONCEAL ORIGINS OF SAF WEAPONS

Since 2011, CAR and other research organisations have extensively documented the Sudanese government's efforts to obscure the origin of imported weapons which it supplies to other state and non-state actors across sub-Saharan Africa. These efforts include:

- Repackaging Chinese- and Iranian-manufactured small arms ammunition and applying new lot numbers to boxes, which imply Sudanese production; and
- Systematically erasing ('sanitising') factory codes and serial number markings—including marks applied to internal parts—on Chinese-produced assault rifles.<sup>10</sup>

In the past, Chinese and Russian arms supply agreements with Sudan have specifically prohibited the unauthorised re-transfer of imported weaponry beyond Sudan's borders, or into Darfur following UN Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005).<sup>11</sup> It is plausible that Sudan's efforts to conceal the origin of imported weapons are to conceal violations of these end-use agreements—particularly since such violations might jeopardise its relations with the governments concerned and future access to arms imports.

2016 seizures in Blue Nile indicate that the Sudanese government has continued and

expanded this type of concealment since 2015. CAR's investigations indicate that the practice was previously limited to Chinese small arms ammunition of 12.7 x 108 mm calibre or larger. Sudan itself domestically produces smaller calibres—including 7.62 x 39 mm (AK-pattern), 7.62 x 51 mm (G3-pattern) and 7.62 x 54R mm (PKM-pattern)—whose origins Sudan did not need to conceal. In Blue Nile, however, CAR documented 48 Sudanese-packed crates of 7.62 x 54R mm ammunition marked with Sudanese-standard lot numbers, which indicated 2015 'production,' but containing 48,000 rounds of 7.62 x 54R mm ammunition whose construction, materials and headstamp (811\_14) are consistent with Chinese 2014 production (Figures 16-20).

Similarly, Sudan is known previously to have erased markings from Chinese Type 56-1 rifles—largely manufactured in the early 2000s—which it has subsequently supplied to proxy non-state forces within and beyond Sudan.<sup>12</sup> In Blue Nile, CAR documented similarly sanitized but newly acquired Chinese small arms. They include a QLZ-87 35 mm grenade launcher containing Chinese 2013-manufactured spin-stabilised grenades (Figure 21).<sup>13</sup> SAF has previously deployed un-sanitised launchers of this type to South Kordofan and Blue Nile.<sup>14</sup> Recent attempts to conceal their origins suggest that Sudan may have become more sensitive to exposing its use and onward retransfer of imported weapons.



Box containing 120 mm mortar round and fuses.

**CHINESE AND RUSSIAN ARMS SUPPLY AGREEMENTS WITH SUDAN HAVE SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITED THE UNAUTHORISED RE-TRANSFER OF IMPORTED WEAPONRY BEYOND SUDAN'S BORDERS.**

**Figures 16-20**


Re-boxed and bagged Chinese 7.62 x 54R mm ammunition (2014 production) in Sudanese crates, which bear Sudanese 2015 lot numbers. Captured in Aroum and Mufu, April 2016. Documented by CAR in a SPLA-N military area, February 2017 (precise location withheld).



**Figure 16**



**Figure 17**



**Figure 18**



**Figure 19**



**Figure 20**

**Figure 21**

Chinese-produced QLZ-87 35 mm grenade launcher with erased factory code. Captured in Mufu, April 2016. Documented in a SPLA-N military area, February 2017 (precise location withheld). CAR has previously documented examples of these weapons in SAF stockpiles. The weapons bore serial numbers that were earlier in sequence to those documented in Blue Nile, which suggests earlier production dates. They also bore the Chinese factory code 9656.<sup>15</sup>



**Figure 21**



# 4. HEAVY LOGISTICS VEHICLES

---

CAR examined six heavy logistics vehicles captured from SAF in Mufu and Aroum in April 2016. Four were military 4 x 4 heavy trucks of European manufacture (UNIMOG 1300L, MAN KAT-1, and DAF YA4440 models). These four are types that a Dutch export company, Van Vliet Handelsonderneming B.V., has exported by sea from Amsterdam and

Antwerp to Port Sudan from 2010 to at least December 2014.<sup>16</sup> Two of the four vehicles documented in Blue Nile carried Van Vliet shipping stickers and paperwork. (There is no suggestion of any illegality or wrongdoing on the part of these trucks' supplier.)

## Figures 22-23

German-made MAN KAT-1 6 x 6 vehicle exported by Van Vliet, captured from SAF in Mufu, April 2016. Documented by CAR in an SPLA-N military area, February 2017 (precise location withheld).



Figure 22



**Figure 23**

These findings highlight efforts by European states and exporters to prevent SAF from procuring equipment from the EU which has dual civilian/military uses, but which is nonetheless of key military importance.

The manufacturers of all three vehicle types designed and supplied them to NATO armed forces with specific military features. For instance, the DAF YA4440 has a specially reinforced cab roof designed to support a machine gun ring mount.<sup>17</sup> EU Member States' export regulations for such trucks nonetheless vary significantly. Some Member States require export licences and others do not.<sup>18</sup>

Previous investigations in 2012 led the Dutch government to alert Van Vliet of the diversion of its vehicles to SAF military use in the Two Areas.<sup>19</sup> Prior to 2012, the Dutch company made several shipments of military trucks to a company in Khartoum, Concept Developments Co. Ltd., which shares an address with GIAD Investments. These shipments were not in themselves unlawful, and did not require an export licence from the Netherlands.<sup>20</sup> GIAD Investments is a state-owned affiliate of Sudan's Military Industry Corporation.<sup>21</sup> Concept Developments Co. Ltd. paid for the vehicles from an account at Sudan's Omdurman National Bank, which the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan has written is 'commonly known in the Sudan as the bank of the Sudanese Armed Forces.'<sup>22</sup>

CAR's 2016-17 investigations, with the assistance of the Dutch government, indicate that the company

continued to export military trucks in bulk to Sudan until at least the end of 2014, although in consultation with the Dutch government. In June 2016, CAR documented three of eight Dutch-made DAF YA4440 trucks, carrying SAF military markings, which SPLA-N had captured from SAF in South Kordofan during the 2015 and 2016 fighting seasons.<sup>23</sup> All three had been shipped by Van Vliet to companies in Sudan between 2012 and 2014—the last as part of a shipment of fifty trucks made in December 2014 to a company called Harees International Group Ltd. According to the exporter's statements to the Dutch government, the Harees Group required the vehicles 'for a garbage collection service to be introduced by Harees in Khartoum.'<sup>24</sup> In February 2017, CAR documented another Dutch-made DAF YA4440 truck in Blue Nile, which the SPLA-N had reportedly captured from SAF in Aroum in April 2016. CAR has not yet been able to trace this vehicle's supply route.<sup>25</sup> If it was part of the same shipment, or a subsequent transfer to Harees International Group, this would suggest that the diversion of the 'garbage collection' truck to military use was not an isolated incident, but a more systematic means of procuring vehicles for military operations.

In response to previous evidence of diversion to military use in Sudan, the Dutch government has increased export controls on such vehicles. Since September 2016 it has required exporters of all vehicles, which were originally designed for military use, to obtain export licences regardless of the vehicles' subsequent demilitarisation, on the grounds that they remain strategically valuable.<sup>26</sup>

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

---

Connors, Shaun and Christopher Foss. 2011. *Jane's Military Vehicles and Logistics 2011/12*. London: Jane's Information Group.

Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of Foreign Trade and Development). 2016. *Aanscherping exportcontrolebeleid op oud legervoertuigen*. Den Haag: Government of the Netherlands. 24 May. <<https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/exportcontrole-strategische-goederen/nieuws/2016/05/24/aanscherping-exportcontrolebeleid-op-oud-legervoertuigen>>

Gramizzi, Claudio and Jérôme Tubiana. 2013. *New Wars, old Enemies: Conflict Dynamics in South Kordofan*. HSBA Working Paper 29. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. March. p. 38.

Gramizzi, Claudio, Lewis, Michael and Jérôme Tubiana. 2012. 'Letter Dated 24 January 2011 from Former Members of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) and Renewed Pursuant to Resolution 1954 (2010) Addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) Concerning the Sudan.' *Africa Confidential*. 13 April. <<http://bit.ly/ljpkqp>>

Gramizzi, Claudio. 2013. *At an Impasse: The Conflict in Blue Nile*, HSBA Working Paper 31. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. December.

Lewis, Michael. 2009. *Skirting the Law: post-CPA arms flows in Sudan*, HSBA Working Paper 18. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. October.

Small Arms Survey, 2016. *Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA): Conflict In the Two Areas*. (Geneva: Small Arms Survey. February. <<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/de/facts-figures/sudan/the-two-areas.html>>

U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2006, *Recent OFAC Actions*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Treasury. 18 July. <<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20060718.aspx>>.

United Nations. 2007. Security Council Resolution 1747. New York: United Nations. 24 March.

United Nations. 2015. Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005). S/2016/805. 4 December. Paragraph 90

United Nations. 2016. List Established by resolution 2231 (2015). New York: United Nations. 17 January. <[http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/2231%20List\\_17%20Jan.htm](http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/2231%20List_17%20Jan.htm)>

# ENDNOTES

---

- 1 See Lewis (2009).
- 2 This assessment is based on CAR's investigations in South Kordofan in mid-2016, which are the subject of a larger forthcoming report in 2017.
- 3 Two exceptions are vehicles: Rakhksh armoured personnel carriers first seen in Sudan in 2005, and several Iranian-produced 'Ababil'-series unmanned aerial vehicles observed in Darfur and the Two Areas from 2007 onwards. See Lewis (2009).
- 4 Conflict Armament Research, forthcoming public report on SAF weapons in the Nuba Mountains (2017) and Gramizzi (2013). Observed Iranian materiel has included 7.62 x 54R mm, 12.7 x 108 mm and 23 x 152B mm ammunition; 60 mm mortar rounds; 81 mm and 120 mm mortar tubes; and Type 4 anti-personnel landmines.
- 5 See United Nations (2016) and U.S. Department of the Treasury (2006).
- 6 This cabling, produced by company SIMIA Wire & Cable Mfg, is labelled with the ISO 9001 production standard. SIMIA's website claims that the company obtained ISO 9001 certification in 2002. See <[http://www.simiacable.com/en/index.php/about\\_quality](http://www.simiacable.com/en/index.php/about_quality)> (no date).
- 7 See United Nations (2007, para. 5).
- 8 See Small Arms Survey (2016).
- 9 The body of the APC appears similar to the WZ523 armoured personnel carrier, but previously known examples of the WZ523 have been armed with 12.7 x 108 mm and 7.62 x 54R mm machine guns. This example, however, appears to have a heavier weapons turret carrying a 30 x 165 mm cannon (as well as a co-axially mounted 7.62 x 54R mm machine gun).
- 10 For a summary, see Conflict Armament Research, forthcoming public report on SAF weapons in the Nuba Mountains (2017).
- 11 Gramizzi, Lewis, and Tubiana (2012).
- 12 CAR infers this production period from the rifles' serial number sequences: most carry seven-digit serial numbers beginning with '48,' which indicates 2003 manufacture.
- 13 The grenades include DFS87 HE grenades carrying lot number 1-13-03 and DFJ87 HEDP grenades carrying lot number Y1-13-343. QLZ-35 grenade launchers first began to appear with SAF and its proxies in Darfur in 2006. See Lewis (2009).
- 14 Gramizzi (2013).
- 15 Serial numbers 141010, 141169, and 141807. See entries in CAR's iTrace® database ([itrace.conflictarm.com](http://itrace.conflictarm.com)).

- 16 CAR correspondence with the Government of the Netherlands (see footnote 24); Gramizzi, Lewis, and Tubiana (2012); Gramizzi and Tubiana (2013). The six vehicles documented were (1) two German-made UNIMOG 1300L 4 x 4 military trucks, one carrying Van Vliet shipping papers in a wallet on its windscreen; (2) a German-made MAN 6 x 6 KAT-1 military truck, also carrying Van Vliet shipping papers; (3) a Dutch-made DAF YA4440 4 x 4 truck; (4) a Chinese-made Shaanxi (aka ‘Shacman’) SX2190 6 x 6 truck; and (5) a Chinese-made ShenXing YGP9640 6 x 6 low loader.
- 17 Connors and Foss (2011).
- 18 For instance: Germany, the manufacturing country of ex-Bundeswehr MAN KAT-1 trucks shipped from the Netherlands to Sudan in 2010-11, regarded them unambiguously as military items requiring licences for export outside the EU (though not to the Netherlands) and prohibited for export to the Sudanese government under the terms of the 1994 EU arms embargo on Sudan. By contrast the Dutch government regarded them as civilian vehicles and did not require Dutch exporters to obtain export licences to ship them to Sudan: see Gramizzi and Tubiana (2013), pp. 38-9. Similarly, as of January 2017 the Dutch government regards the DAF YA4440 trucks shipped to Sudan, and subsequently deployed by SAF in Blue Nile, as civilian items, not requiring export licences as long as their blackout lights have been removed (CAR correspondence with Government of the Netherlands, 27 January 2017). By contrast, UK exporters’ promotional material states that the same trucks require export licences if shipped from the UK. See, for example, <<http://www.ljacksonandco.com/index.php/search-results-by-description/article/11529>> (no date). In any case, the Dutch exporter listed the trucks that it shipped to Sudan in December 2014 in shipping papers as DAF1800 vehicles—the civilian variant of the model—although the vehicles’ internal data-plates confirm that they are YA4440 military models (Government of the Netherlands correspondence with CAR, 16 December 2016).
- 19 Gramizzi and Tubiana (2013), pp. 38-39.
- 20 Gramizzi and Tubiana (2013), p. 38.
- 21 Gramizzi and Tubiana (2013), p. 38.
- 22 United Nations (2015, para. 90).
- 23 Conflict Armament Research, forthcoming public report on SAF weapons in the Nuba Mountains (2017).
- 24 For full details, see Conflict Armament Research, forthcoming public report on SAF weapons in the Nuba Mountains (2017). On 16 December 2016, the Government of the Netherlands responded to a formal trace request issued by CAR on 5 September 2016. This response confirms that: 1) Van Vliet Handelsonderneming B.V. (Nieuwenkerk a/d IJssel), located in the Netherlands, exported the DAF military truck with chassis number 00193865, the subject of CAR’s trace request; 2) Van Vliet Handelsonderneming B.V. sold the vehicle to Harees International Group LTD, (P.O. Box 7091, H. No. 94 Block 11, Elriyadh Khartoum in Sudan), subject to invoice no. 365626 dated 18 December 2014; 3) This truck was sold as part of a consignment of 50 similar DAF YA4440 DT 405 vehicles; 4) The intended use of these trucks was for a garbage collection service being introduced by Harees in Khartoum, Sudan. 5) The consignment was shipped aboard the MV Gran Bretagne on 17 December 2014; 6) The Government of Netherlands enforcement unit visited Van Vliet Handelsonderneming B.V. on 1 November 2016 to assess administration procedure. 7) The vehicle in question did not at the time of export require a Dutch export licence, due to not being classified as a military vehicle as defined in item ML6 of the (EU) Common Military List; 8) Due to previous questions relating to exports of military trucks by Van Vliet to Sudan, Van Vliet nonetheless consulted the Office of Export Control and Strategic Goods in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands prior to exporting the vehicles to Harees International Group Ltd. The Office of Export Control and Strategic Goods agreed that 50 DAF trucks could be supplied to Harees subject to their cabins being repainted, and Harees International Group Ltd providing confirmation of their use in garbage collection. Harees subsequently supplied Van Vliet with four undated photographs showing a white DAF YA4440 truck – chassis number unconfirmed – ostensibly being used for garbage collection.

- 25 Correspondence with Government of the Netherlands, 3 March 2017.
- 26 See the Government of the Netherlands (2016). In correspondence with CAR on 27 January 2017, the Government of the Netherlands stated that “the change in interpretation the Netherlands has announced and implemented does not affect the DAF YA 4440. This truck is an adapted DAF 1800 and when the blackout lights are removed there’s nothing military about it.”

